← CyberChef

cyberchef.tools — Privacy Policy

Last updated: 22 September 2026

This policy covers the website at cyberchef.tools — the pages served from this domain, the app itself and the landing pages beside it at /extension/ and /relay/. It describes what this deployment does and nothing else. The browser extension has its own separate policy.

1. What this site is

This is a static mirror of GCHQ's CyberChef (Crown copyright, released under the Apache-2.0 licence). It is the same application, built from the same source, served as plain files.

It is operated independently by the developer of the CyberChef browser extension. It is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or operated by GCHQ. GCHQ's own copy of CyberChef lives at gchq.github.io/CyberChef, and that is the site to use if you would rather not rely on this one.

The version deployed here is kept in step with the version of the CyberChef engine bundled inside the extension, so that handing a recipe from the extension to this site lands on a matching build.

Three things are added on top of the upstream project: the deployment itself, the analytics described in section 6, and the workbench — a layer of investigation features built on the same engine (recipe shelves and guided walk-throughs, output viewers, log and Sigma tools, a command palette and the rest). The workbench runs in your browser like everything else. Sections 2 to 5 set out exactly what it keeps on your machine, and the one feature that can contact anybody else — only after you switch it on and press the button yourself. No operation and no part of the workbench sends your input, your output or your recipe to this site.

2. Your data stays in your browser

CyberChef performs every operation on your own machine. The whole application is downloaded to your browser and runs there. When you paste text, drop a file in, build a recipe and bake it, the input, the recipe and the output are handled entirely by JavaScript running in your browser tab.

Nothing you paste, type, drop or decode is sent to this server for processing. There is no workbench processing backend. The optional usage analytics in section 6 receives only its documented event fields, never the material you are working on. Optional network operations and Endpoint lookups are described separately below.

What the workbench keeps on your machine

The workbench remembers your settings and your own material so they are still there when you come back. The IOC lists you import are written to this browser's IndexedDB, to a database named cyberchef-workbench belonging to this origin — they are the only thing kept there. Everything else — saved recipes, recent recipes, your theme, per-recipe notes and parameters, the workbench's own option toggles and any Endpoint API keys you enter (section 3) — is written to this browser's localStorage on this origin.

None of it is uploaded. There is no account to sync it to and no workbench synchronisation service. It is storage on your machine, read only by this page in this browser, and it goes away when you clear this site's data.

One optional feature reads outside that storage: “Offer to peel what I just copied” in Options, which is off by default. With it on, the page reads the clipboard at three deliberate moments — when you return to the tab, when the tab becomes visible, and when you press Cmd/Ctrl+V outside a text box — and your browser asks you for clipboard permission the first time. What it reads is offered to you on a strip under the input and nothing more is done with it: it is not saved, not written to IndexedDB or localStorage, and not sent anywhere. Only a short numeric fingerprint is held, in memory, so the same clipboard is not offered to you twice. Leave the option off and the clipboard is never read at all.

Anything the workbench lets you export — a CSV of scan results, a masked card report, a log export — is built inside the page and handed straight to your browser's download machinery; it is not posted anywhere on the way. Importing a file, such as an IOC list, reads the file you pick, in the page.

Recipes and inputs in the URL

CyberChef can carry a recipe and an input in the address bar, in the part of the URL after the #:

https://cyberchef.tools/#recipe=From_Base64()&input=<your text, base64>

That part of a URL is called the fragment. Browsers do not include the fragment in the HTTP request they send to a server. The request that reaches this site — and the host in front of it — carries the path and query string, not the fragment. The page reads the fragment locally, in your browser, and processes it there. So a recipe and an input in the address bar are not transmitted to this site in the request.

That is a property of how browsers work, and it does not make such a URL private. The whole URL, fragment included, goes into your browser history — and so into anything that reads your history: profile sync across your devices, session restore, the address bar's suggestions, screen sharing, and anyone with access to your machine. A URL you paste into a chat or an issue tracker carries the input with it, in full, to whoever reads it. Treat a CyberChef link as if it contains the data it contains, because it does. One more consequence of that is set out under page views in section 6.

3. The Endpoint tier — the one feature that can leave your browser

Everything in section 2 is unconditional. The Endpoint tier is the single exception, and it is off by default.

It has to be armed twice before anything is sent. First you switch on “Allow Endpoint lookups with my own API keys” in Options. Then, next to a particular indicator, you press a particular button carrying the amber Endpoint label. Only then, and only for that one indicator, does a request leave your browser. Nothing is looked up in the background, on a timer, or in bulk.

What is sent is the value of the indicator you pressed the button beside — an IP address, a domain, a URL, an MD5, SHA-1 or SHA-256 hash, or a CVE id — carried in the request URL, together with the API key for that vendor in a request header where a key is used. Your input, your output, your recipe and your notes are not part of the request.

Three vendors are contacted directly by your browser:

Four more cannot be called from a browser at all, because they send no CORS headers. They are reachable only through a relay whose address you configure yourself; with no relay set, their buttons are disabled and say why. When you have set one, the request goes to your relay, and your relay goes to the vendor:

API keys you enter are kept in this browser's localStorage, in clear text, on your own machine, alongside your other preferences. They are not encrypted, they are never sent to this site, and each key is sent only to the vendor it belongs to — or, for the four relayed vendors, to the relay you pointed at that vendor. Anyone who can read this browser profile can read those keys. If that is not acceptable on the machine you are using, do not enter them. The same goes for the optional relay token, a shared secret some relays require: it is kept in localStorage beside the relay address and is sent, as a request header, only to the relay you configured — never to a vendor, and never to this site.

Once a request reaches a vendor it is that vendor's, and the vendor's own privacy policy governs it — not this one. They see your IP address, the value you looked up, and, where a key is used, which account looked it up. If you configured a relay, whoever runs that relay (most likely you) sees the same. This site does not operate a relay; the Worker source and instructions at /relay/ are published for you to deploy yourself. It receives nothing back from these lookups, and keeps no record that you made one: the result is shown to you, on your machine.

4. Working offline, and installing the app

This site registers a service worker — a small script your browser runs on this origin so the app still opens when the network is slow or absent. It caches this site's own files and nothing else: the page, the scripts, the styles, the images. Every request that is not same-origin is ignored by it outright, so it never fetches, caches or observes another site's resources, and it sends nothing anywhere itself. Its cache lives in your browser and is cleared with this site's data.

A few parts of the app are large enough that they are only downloaded when you first use them — the YARA engine behind the YARA scan view is one of them. Like everything else the app loads, it is one of this site's own files, served from this origin and cached by that same service worker; nothing you scan with it leaves your browser.

Because of that service worker and a web app manifest, your browser may offer to install this site as an app. Installing changes where the window lives, not what the code does: the same files run in the same browser sandbox, under everything described in this policy. Installing it and then taking the network away is the simplest way to see for yourself that the app does not need to talk to anybody.

No downloadable copy of this app is offered. There is no zip, no installer and no other package of it to obtain, and nothing on this site links to one; the installable app described above is this site, cached by your own browser. NETWORK.md sets out exactly what this app sends and how to check it from your browser's developer tools, an intercepting proxy or a machine with no network at all.

5. Sharing text to the app, and opening files with it

An installed copy can register with your operating system as a share target and as a handler for file types such as .txt, .log, .csv, .json, .eml and .pem.

Opening a file with CyberChef keeps that file on your machine. Your browser hands the page a handle to the file you chose, the page reads it locally and puts its contents into an input tab. The contents are never transmitted, to this site or to anyone else.

Sharing text to CyberChef also keeps that text on your machine. The share target is a POST, and the request it makes never leaves your browser: it is answered by the service worker from section 4, which is this site's own code running locally on this origin. The service worker reads the shared text out of the form body, hands it back to the page in the URL fragment as #input=<your text, base64>, and the page loads it into an input tab. The shared text is never sent to the host, so it does not appear in this site's hosting request logs at Cloudflare (section 7), and it is not included in any analytics event, because the analytics excludes shared text and URL fragments (section 6).

What it does become is part of a CyberChef link, with everything section 2 says about that: the fragment goes into your browser history and into the address bar, like any URL carrying an input. If the text you were about to share is sensitive, that is the thing to weigh — or paste it into the input instead of sharing it.

6. Analytics

The hosted site offers optional first-party product analytics. After you select Allow analytics, fixed usage events go to /api/analytics on this domain. A Cloudflare Pages Function validates them and stores them in Cloudflare D1. A private dashboard, protected by Cloudflare Access, displays reports to the site operator. Cloudflare hosts and processes this information; first-party does not mean that analytics stays on your device.

Before you allow analytics, no analytics visitor identifier is created and no usage events are sent. The Analytics settings control lets you change your choice. Global Privacy Control and Do Not Track disable collection. The workbench continues to work with analytics declined, blocked, or unavailable. Offline builds do not load this analytics runtime.

Existing Google Analytics reports remain available separately to the operator. Their historical aggregate archives in D1 have no automatic expiry. First-party and Google counts are never added together, and the first-party visitor and session identifiers are never shared with Google.

What is sent

What is never sent

Your input. Your output. The arguments you type into an operation. The contents of a file you load. The text of a recipe. None of it appears in any analytics event: the events above are the complete list, and their parameters are counts or fixed labels, apart from the existing operation name sent by operation_add. There is no code on this site that reads your input or output for analytics purposes.

Searches, recipe names and contents, walkthrough and challenge identities, files and filenames, viewer activity, command-palette text, Endpoint activity, Magic candidates, Magic output and tool results are not sent. Magic telemetry contains only the fixed state and outcome labels listed above.

Retention and your choice

First-party event and session records are retained for 90 days, visitor first/last-seen metadata for at most 365 days, and daily aggregate history for 730 days. Hashed visitor identifiers used for rate limiting expire after two days. A daily scheduled job removes expired records. Reports count browser identifiers; they cannot identify unique people and do not include visitors who decline or block analytics.

7. Hosting

This site is served by Cloudflare Pages. Like any web host, Cloudflare sees the requests your browser makes in order to answer them, and records request metadata in its logs — your IP address, your user agent, and the path requested. That processing is Cloudflare's, under Cloudflare's privacy policy.

Cloudflare also serves some of its own platform code from paths beginning /cdn-cgi/ on this domain — its bot-detection script, for example — and may set its own cookies for security purposes. That is the host's platform rather than the CyberChef application, and it is covered by the same Cloudflare policy.

The application itself remains a client-side workbench. Cloudflare Pages Functions receives optional analytics events, and a protected administrator route reads first-party reports and historical Google Analytics reports. D1 stores analytics as described in section 6. These routes do not receive or store CyberChef inputs, outputs, recipes or files.

8. Cookies and browser storage

First-party analytics uses localStorage for its consent preference and, only after consent, random visitor/session identifiers. These identifiers are sent only in the documented analytics request body. They are not authentication credentials. See section 6 for expiry and withdrawal.

Cookies from earlier Google Analytics visits may remain until they expire or you clear this site's data. Cloudflare may separately set security and bot-detection cookies as the host; see section 7.

Saved recipes, themes, interface preferences and Endpoint keys remain local workbench data, and imported IOC lists remain in IndexedDB, as described in section 2. Analytics never reads that material. Clearing site data erases local workbench storage and the analytics preference and identifiers; it does not delete analytics records already received by the server.

9. The browser extension

There is a CyberChef browser extension by the same developer. Its public version is a thin client: extension controls collect the selected page text locally and frame cyberchef.tools for the workbench. Operations still run in that framed page in the browser. Because it is the same hosted site, the analytics choice in section 6 applies. A consented load is counted in the total product figures and under the fixed surface_extension label. The separately distributed private offline workbench uses bundled files and does not load the hosted analytics script.

This site is one of the endpoints the extension can be pointed at, and it is never the default. What the extension sends here, and only when you ask it to, is described in its own policy.

10. Changes to this policy

If what this site does with data changes, this policy changes with it, and the "last updated" date at the top changes too. The current version is always the one published at https://cyberchef.tools/privacy.

11. Contact

Questions, corrections, or something here that does not match what you observe: [CONTACT].

(A public contact address for this site has not been chosen yet. This placeholder will be replaced with one.)